Mexican Labor News & Analysis

Mexico's Labor Law Reform

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Robin Alexander and Dan LaBotz

Special Edition: Labor Law Reform

Labor law reform is a very hot topic in Mexico today, as progressive and reactionary forces have both introduced proposed legislation. The outcome will either remove the major obstacles to organizing democratic unions, or effectively prevent democratic unions from organizing, while at the same time stripping away some of the historic protections which were a product of the Mexican revolution.

Shortly after Vicente Fox was elected president of Mexico, some investigative reporters went to the Fox family farms and found underage children working in the fields in violation of the Constitution and Federal Labor Law (LFT). Their presence was hardly a surprise. Fox, himself a farmer, manufacturer, and former executive for the multinational Coca Cola company, is a typical representative of the Mexican capitalist class and of the foreign multinationals operating in Mexico, neither of which has much respect for the labor law.

For decades Mexican corporations and the multinationals have wanted to roll back laws and regulations that protect the country's workers. Now their chance has come. On December 12, 2002, the PAN introduced proposed legislation in the lower house of the Mexican Congress, (the House of Deputies) which may be considered during the present session, March 15 to April 30. Also before the House is a proposal for labor law reform introduced by the PRD on October 31. While both of these proposals make concessions to employers in the area of productivity, they represent two radically different visions for Mexico's future. The former would strengthen the system of corporativist control over unions, further stifling the growth of democratic unions, while giving business the "flexibility" it has been demanding. In contrast, the PRD proposal attacks the roots of corporativist domination and corruption, replacing the present system with one which is impartial, freeing workers to exercise their rights of freedom of association, while granting business more limited "flexibility." The outcome will have a dramatic impact on the character of labor relations in Mexico for decades to come.

Carlos Abascal Carranza, Fox's Secretary of Labor, and a former head of the Mexican Employers Association (COPARMEX), has overseen the process by which the government's proposal for labor law reform was developed. In July of 2001 he initiated the talks between his department, the Secretary of Labor (STPS), the Business Coordinating Council (CCE) and the labor unions, both the Congress of Labor (CT) and the National Union of Workers (UNT)1, with a commitment that no legislation would be introduced in the absence of a consensus. The talks were entitled "Mesa de Modernizacion y Actualizacion de la Legislacion Laboral (Panel on Modernization and Effectuation of Labor Legislation)." However, as the Panel's discussions progressed and it appeared that there were major differences between the positions of the UNT 2 and the other participants, the UNT was forced out and the remaining parties fashioned a piece of legislation which is far from a consensus3.

The fundamental thrust of the proposal is to maintain even tighter government control over the labor unions and their right to strike, while at the same time granting employers a greater role in labor relations, and giving them more flexibility in the use of labor. The proposal has been vigorously opposed by the independent labor federation, the National Union of Workers (UNT) and by the left-of-center Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).

A Brief History

Mexico's labor law originated in the revolution of 1910-1920, producing the Constitution of 1917. Article 123 of that Constitution gave workers the right to organize labor unions and to strike. It also provided protection for women and children, the eight hour day, and a living wage. When written, it was the most progressive labor law in the world. However, it was not until 1931 that Article 123 found expression in national legislation in the form of the Ley Federal de Trabajo or Federal Labor Law (LFT)4. By then, the Mexican state dominated by former president and power-behind-the-throne Plutarco Elías Calles had found inspiration in Benito Mussolini's fascist state with its authoritarian corporate structure.

The LFT established the Juntas de Conciliación y Arbitraje (the Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration), made up of representative of the government, employers and labor unions. The state thus became the ultimate arbiter of labor relations, a role strengthened over time. The Secretary of Labor and the Juntas maintain a strict system of legal control over labor unions: unions must have a legal registration (registro), must have an officially recognized right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements (titularidad), and must periodically re-register their officers and be accepted by the state (toma de nota).

The system operates to the detriment of independent unions . Although this system of labor relations initially conferred real benefits on workers and peasants whose organizations supported the government, it now functions to maintain a status quo where benefits flow only to corrupt union leaders. Consequently, democratic unions must confront not only corporations, but the corrupt, official unions and in most cases the labor authorities as well.
This is because under the tri-partite structure described above, the seat of the representatives of labor is almost always filled by the largest of the official union federations -- the CTM -- the business representative will always oppose an independent union, and the presidency of the labor boards is held by the government -- generally the PRI, occasionally the PAN, and only on very rare occasions by the PRD. This means that in virtually all cases at least two, and usually all three members of the labor board have a vested interest in seeing that the independent union loses.

There are also practices that severely interfere with a democratic union's ability to navigate through the legal maze which it encounters. First, unlike the United States, a union must have a certification or registro before it is may legally represent workers in a particular workplace. While these are theoretically available by following a relatively simple administrative process, and in fact are available to the official unions in a matter of days or weeks, the pretexts for denying them to independent unions are, in the words of one democratic lawyer "as vast as one's imagination." 1

The second major obstacle is the practice by employers of entering into protection contracts with "sindicatos fantasmas" or "ghost unions," often before a plant is ever built. Various groups, such as the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (ANAD) and the independent UNT estimate that between 80 and 90 percent of all contracts fall into that category. The system is so effective that it is extremely difficult for independent unions to obtain registros, win elections, or gain the legal right to represent workers.

Protection contracts impede real unionization in several ways. The first is that these contracts usually contain only the minimum conditions with respect to wages, benefits, etc. required by Mexican law. Second, one of the clauses is generally what is called an exclusion clause - giving the union the right to instruct the employer to fire workers. Despite the fact that Mexican courts have held it unconstitutional to fire workers because they seek to organize a different union, this clause is routinely used for that purpose. As a consequence, one of the major differences in organizing in the United States and Mexico is that while U.S. unions often use public demonstrations of strength (use of buttons or stickers, petitions or demands for recognition) as a test of strength prior to petitioning for an election, in Mexico union organizing must be totally clandestine until the moment the legal petition is filed.

The third way in which protection contracts function to deter real unionization is that they make it legally much more difficult to organize: in Mexico different legal procedures apply depending on whether a union has already been certified. If there is no union, the workers who are seeking union representation file their proposed contract along with a strike notification. This puts the employer on notice that it must either accept the contract, negotiate something different or face a strike; it puts the union in a much stronger position than in the U.S. where we must first win an election and only then have the right to negotiate a contract.
If a union exists in a plant, the democratic challenger must file a petition with the labor board seeking an election to determine which union in fact represents a majority of the workers. Since the labor board is almost always strongly biased against the independent union, this usually results in interminable delays. And if and when an election is finally held, it will be by voice vote rather than secret ballot. Thus, workers will have to present their credentials to a representative of the labor board who will be flanked by multiple representatives of the employer and official union (and often union goons) and a limited number of representatives of the independent union. (The elections are held within the plants so the employer has the right to permit entry to the thugs and exclude all but a few representatives from the independent union). Finally, even if the independent union should win the election, the original contract remains in place until its expiration, locking the workers into an agreement based on what are generally the minimum requirements mandated by the federal Labor Law.

Another practice that serves as a major obstacle to independent union organizing is the failure to make registries of unions and contracts available to the public. When a union files a representation petition, it is required to follow one of the two legal paths outlined above, depending on whether a union exists in the work place or not. Where a union exists, the petition must contain its correct name, legal address, etc. A petition will be dismissed if the union has either chosen the wrong process (e.g. it thought there was no union when one had been certified) or where information such as the name and address of the incumbent union is inaccurate.

The danger is obvious: if the workers are unaware of the existence of a protection contract, they may file the wrong type of petition, it will be dismissed, and they will be exposed to discharge directly by the employer or at the behest of the union pursuant to the exclusion clause. The Alice in Wonderland character of these proceedings is illustrated by very real cases where the labor board dismisses a representation petitions because the name or address of the incumbent union which is being challenged is incorrect, when it is the government (and not the independent union which has filed the petition) which has exclusive access to the correct information through registries of unions and contracts which are not available to the public!

It also should also be noted that the Juntas typically declare strikes to be "inexistente" or non-existent, meaning that striking workers lose legal protections. Consequently, despite many labor protests and work stoppages, the number of legal strikes in Mexico has become negligible 6.

Finally, the system of corruption within the official unions is nurtured by the concentration of power in the position of general secretary, and the lack of transparency in union affairs and finances.

Labor Law Reform

The recent pressure for labor law reform came primarily from three sources: the independent labor unions which sought greater transparency and freedom from government interference and corruption under the banner of freedom of association in order to address the obstacles outlined above, and Mexican and foreign corporations which, along with the international financial institutions sought less regulation and greater "flexibilization."

Beginning in the late 1960s Mexico saw a labor insurgency with both attempts to democratize the state-controlled unions and attempts to create genuine independent unions. Academics, attorneys and some of the independent unions developed a critique of the labor relations system and the state-controlled unions and argued that workers needed the right to organize unions of their own choosing with the right to strike.

Many employers resented the Mexican Federal Labor Law that, based on the Constitution, required that they hire workers by the week rather than the day or hour, a system that made it difficult to create a contingent workforce made up of temporary and part-time workers. They hated the corrupt, government-protected unions that shook them down for labor peace payments. But the vast majority were even more opposed to democratic or independent unions that might use their power to raise wages, take more control over the shop floor, or begin to press for an agenda that would redress the economic and social inequalities in the society.

Meanwhile, as Mexico began to pursue a development strategy based on foreign investment and opened its economy, privatizing hundreds of government owned businesses, it came under intense pressure from transnational corporations to change its labor laws. There was also pressure related to negotiations over Mexico's entry into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in 1986 and with the NAFTA treaty that took effect in 1994. International financial institutions also got into the act, explicitly requiring that Mexico reform its labor law in accordance with the neo-liberal model which was the basis for structural adjustment programs throughout the world 7. As Mexican labor lawyer Manuel Fuentes suggested, a new labor regime was gradually being imposed on Mexico from the North 8.

As a result of these various developments, in the late 1980s the PRI's technocrats and Mexican employers' associations began to put forward their vision of a "new labor culture," one that emphasized productivity. They argued that workers' wages and conditions would improve with rising investments, new technology, and, above all, increased productivity. During the administration of Carlos Salinas, Francisco Hernández Juárez of the Mexican Telephone Workers Union and the Federation of Unions of Goods and Services (FESEBES) which he led also embraced a version of the "new labor culture" based on rising productivity 9.

COPARMEX, the employers' association, first proposed labor law reform in the late 1980s, but with little chance of passage under the PRI government with its ties to the CT labor unions. In 1995, during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo, a year after the implementation of NAFTA and of the Chiapas Rebellion led by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, Nestor de Buen, a highly respected labor lawyer, drafted a labor law reform proposal put forward in the Senate by the National Action Party (PAN). Although it was put forward by the PAN 10, de Buen's proposal was not simply a pro-business bill. The de Buen proposal, inspired in part by Spain's labor law and by International Labor Organization standards and language, incorporated not only ideas emanating from management, but from the independent unions as well.

De Buen's proposal called for a new labor relations system as well as a new labor law for Mexico in the "globalized" world. His proposal would have replaced the tripartite labor boards or "juntas" with an independent judge. He offered the employers a system that would give them more productivity, and offered workers greater transparency along with a system of union and contract recognition that would give them more democracy and potentially more power. His proposal did not please the employers who wanted productivity but feared workers' democracy and power. It did not please union officials who feared to lose their government protection. And it did not please workers who did not want to give up historic protections to increase productivity for their employers. Nevertheless, it became the inspiration for subsequent proposals 11.

During the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), put forward its own reform proposal incorporating many of de Buen's suggestions, such as independent labor judges and a simpler process for union and contract recognition. At the same time the PRD proposal attempted to preserve many of the historic labor protections, while also making some concessions to employer demands for productivity and putting some limitations on the right to strike 12. With a minority of deputies in the congress, and opposition from both the PRI and the PAN, the PRD proposal died.

The introduction to the current PAN proposal speaks of the need to be a modern, competitive nation, and of a new dynamic in labor relations. It is framed in terms of opportunities for the most productive and qualified workers which are generated by technologically advanced and productive employers. Such opportunities are "promoted by countries which are capable of encouraging the continual development of new and better jobs in order that workers, employers and government should collaborate within a framework of legal security, of respect for the human dignity of workers, of encouragement of production and of the appropriate distribution of the benefits generated by work 13."

Notwithstanding the lofty phrases about of mutual collaboration and interest, the substance of the proposal represents an attempt to strengthen state control over the unions, while extending more power to the employers, and at the same time eliminating worker rights and protections. De Buen's suggestions are gone. Despite a rhetoric flourish in the direction of the democratic unions, not only are their proposals ignored or eviscerated, but the system which has been suffocating them is given new ways to place obstacles in their path. By maintaining the juntas while imposing onerous pre-requisites, the PAN proposal makes it virtually impossible for workers to change unions, to create or join an independent union, or to strike.

For example, a request that an employer sign a contract -- with or without a strike notice -- must accompanied by official documents under the control of the STPS or local labor board, both of which are closely tied to the employers and official unions and unlikely to issue the necessary documentation 14. Moreover, because the certification of the documents is considered a purely administrative process, the Registrar acts at his or her discretion in requiring documentation -- at best delaying the proceeding, at worst imposing requirements that are impossible to meet15.

Similarly, any demand for representational rights must be signed by the workers seeking representation, leaving them exposed to pressure, harassment or discharge. An additional provision would permit consideration of only one representation petition at a time, opening the door to preemptive petitions by ghost unions at the first rumor of organizing activity, which would then serve as a legal bar to the petition of a legitimate union. (See proposed changes to Articles 387, 893-A and 920).

The truly insidious nature of these requirements can be only be truly comprehended when one realizes that they only apply to a union that wishes to demand that the employer sign a contract. In other words, nothing prevents a voluntary agreement between employer and ghost union. Thus, workers seeking to organize democratic unions or bargain collectively are denied their rights to associate or bargain, while the system of protection contracts is permitted to flourish!

At the same time, the PAN's proposal grants employers greater latitude to use contingent workers and removes other protections. In many cases this is done by shifting the burden of proof or through small language changes which appear innocuous but operate to benefit the employer (fn6). Nor does it address the most basic demands of the democratic union movement such as public registries of unions and contracts, secret ballot elections in representation cases 17, and an impartial system for resolving disputes. Opponents call it a "monstrous law" and an "assault on human and labor rights 18."
Yet, Mexican authorities have attempted to present the law as responsive to the issues raised by the democratic labor movement both through the use of rhetoric 19 and by appearing to address the issue of secret ballot elections by saying that the election of union officers may be held by secret ballot or direct vote. Obviously, the failure to require secret ballot elections will mean that they only occur in democratic unions -- totally failing to address the problem of coercion and correction within the official unions.

The UNT, virtually forced out of the negotiations, put forward its own proposal directly to the Mexican legislature with the support of the PRD. Both the tone and substance are vastly different from the PAN's proposal. Although the PAN's proposal gives the impression of extensive revisions, this is largely because the term "employer" replaces "patron (boss)" throughout the text, in order to reflect a greater spirit of cooperation. As indicated above, the devil is in the details, effectuated by word changes, exceptions which undercut the principles they modify, and additional procedural requirements which appear fairly innocuous on the surface but have disastrous implications.

In contrast, the UNT-PRD proposal is much grander in scope, seeking constitutional and legislative changes which would enable workers to freely assert their rights to organize, bargain collectively and strike. The most profound structural changes strike at the heart of the corporativist system and entail the elimination of the Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration and their replacement with federal labor judges, the creation of an independent public registry of labor unions and contracts (along the lines of the electoral commission) with responsibility for conducting elections, and a prohibition that unions may not "require their members to join or leave any party or political group or to pressure them to vote for a particular candidate in the public elections."

The proposal also includes detailed provisions designed to protect the right of workers to associate freely, providing for a secret ballot in all representation matters and union procedures (i.e., on contracts and in union elections); prohibiting both employer and government intervention in union affairs; freeing unions to determine what types of workers should be included in the union; requiring employers to make visible in the workplace and to distribute the text of collective bargaining agreements as well as wage tables to counter the practice of protection contracts; requiring unions to make the same information available, as well as financial information; and prohibiting employers from firing or disciplining workers for exercising their labor rights including voting for or against contract ratification or for any union during a representation election 20.
The UNT expressed the goals of its proposal as follows:

* Modernization of the labor model for the successful insertion of the country into the system of global production.
* Improvement of labor law institutions in order to guarantee legal certainty for employers and workers
* Strengthening of union democracy, freedom and autonomy.
* Dismantling the corporativist system of State control over labor organizations and attacking the roots of corruption in the labor world.
* Flexibility that is based on agreement with legitimate unions by means of collective bargaining in order to guarantee workers rights 21.

While the UNT proposal has the support of many labor organizations, others would prefer to see the existing Federal Labor Law (LFT) left untouched 22. The UNT-PRD proposal has the support of about 100 congressional deputies mostly from the PRD, PT and other small parties but also including a few PRI and PAN supporters.

The Fox-PAN proposal was introduced on December 12, 2002 with 17 signatures from PAN and PRI congressional deputies. Although this suggests that little effort was spent rounding up signatories for the bill's introduction, it is not particularly significant given the current balance of forces in the Mexican Congress. If the Fox-PAN proposal were pushed to a vote in the session which begins March 15th, it would most likely pass -- a development that would represent a set back not only for Mexican workers' rights, but also for the democratization of Mexico.

However, politics in Mexico are never simple, and there is a lot of activity in opposition to the reform already underway, with major mobilizations planned throughout the country. With elections in July for the House of Deputies, parties which actively promote the Fox-PAN reform package are likely to pay a political price. Opponents of the Fox-PAN proposal received an additional shot in the arm on January 8th, when the Mexican Supreme Court resolved conflicting decisions by labor courts in Jalisco and Tabasco, ruling that the labor boards could not impose requirements which were not contained in the Federal Labor Law on a union which decides to strike. This decision represents a serious blow to the stealth effort to "reform" the law by imposing new requirements without legislative approval, and which would have made passage of the PAN's proposal easier by allowing it to be characterized as based on already existing practices.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, Mexican workers are not alone in confronting attacks on labor rights. Ontario has already adopted a regressive labor law reform, while U.S. labor law has been reformed de facto. In the U.S., lengthy delays and insignificant penalties make the NLRB ineffective in protecting workers' rights. Meanwhile, the Bush administration has launched a broad assault on workers: using Taft-Hartley against locked out longshoremen, seeking to privatize federal jobs, to eliminate overtime and the eight hour day, and denying union representation to new members of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At the same time, the Hoffman Plastics decision, issued last year by the U.S. Supreme Court, severely weakened the rights of immigrant workers, eliminating the right to relief even when their labor rights are found to have been violated.

For the past several decades, governments throughout the world have pursued a neoliberal agenda which includes labor law reform in order to attract investment and increase profit. In much of the world workers have lost rights and power, and the result has been increasing poverty. In a surprising and ironic move, the World Bank -- one of the forces responsible for the assault -- has just issued a report recognizing the role of unions in maintaining a decent standard of living.23

But workers are also fighting back. Recent general strikes in Europe backed off labor law reform efforts in various countries. Meanwhile, in Brazil, within the last few decades workers built a new labor federation, a new political party, and with overwhelming popular support just succeeded in electing a worker president of the country!

The two proposals for labor law reform currently before the Mexican legislature represent two options. The UNT-PRD proposal would lift the oppressive burden of corporativism and corruption which has been stifling democracy and depriving Mexican workers of the fundamental rights of freedom of association. In direct contrast, the Fox-PAN proposal is a truly grotesque law that, in the name of modernization, would lock Mexican workers into an antiquated and corrupt system run by venal lawyers and brutal gangsters, subservient to multinational corporations. Fox, elected to bring democracy to Mexico, has in this new labor law fused the worst of the old PRI with the worst of the PAN: the political expression of the marriage of corruption and capital. While both proposals would, to different degrees, permit employers additional flexibility in order to improve productivity and competitiveness, it is our most fervent hope that if the correlation of forces are insufficient to permit affirmative change, that they are sufficiently strong to prevent the destruction of workers' rights that the Fox-PAN proposal represents.

Footnotes

1. The most important of these formerly state-controlled federations of the CT (frequently referred to as charro or official unions) are the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), the Revolutionary Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), and the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC). Other major unions within the CT include the Federation of Unions of Workers at the Service of the State (FSTSE) which represents public employees, the National Teachers Union (el SNTE), which represents over a million teachers and related workers, and the Sole Union of Workers of the Federal District (SUTGDF).

2. The three unions which share the leadership of the UNT are the National Union of Social Security Workers (SNTSS), the Union of Workers of the National Autonomous University (STUNAM), and the Mexican Telephone Workers Union (STRM). Also extremely important in framing the debate because of its experience and perspective is the Authentic Labor Front (FAT).

3. During the Spring of 2002 it became increasingly apparent that Secretary of Labor Abascal was holding separate meetings and preparing his own proposal. Consequently, while continuing to participate in the Panel's discussions, the UNT also began work on its own proposal. That proposal was presented in the House of deputies by the PRD on October 29. Some days later a meeting of the Panel was held at which the STPS presented its proposal for approval. At that point the UNT left, formally breaking with the process. Although the Abascal proposal describes itself as the "product of consensus" it is a consensus between the historical triumvirate - government, business and the official unions - and does not include the UNT.

4. Article 123 remained unchanged for 12 years. However, since it was first modified in 1929 to assert the social utility of a public health and welfare law (ley de seguro social), it has been modified 38 times.

5. Registros vary in scope and may cover a particular sector of workers on a national or regional basis, or may be limited to a particular company or plant.

6. For a critique of the existing system see: Dan La Botz, Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today (Boston: South End Press, 1992) and María Xelhuantizi-López, Democracy on Hold: The Freedom of Union Association and Protection Contracts in Mexico (Washington, D.C.: Communications Workers of America/CWA, 2002).

7. See Mexico: A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era, Lafourcade Oliver , Nguyen Vinh H. , Marcelo M. Giugale, Eds., World Bank , 2001.

8. Manuel Fuentes, La imposición labor que nos viene del norte. Mexico: Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, A.C., 1994.

9. Francisco Hernández Juárez and María Xelhantzi López, El sindicalismo en la reforma del Estado: Una Visión de la Modernización de México (Mexico: Fondo de la Cultura Económica, 1993), 121. The notion that productivity gains would be shared with workers did not, however, jive with the experience of Mexican workers. On the contrary. Between 1982 and 1998, in all sectors, productivity grew by 8.9% while real salaries declined by 31.2 percent, while in manufacturing productivity grew by 12.3 percent and wages declined by 55.9 percent. Center for Labor Reflection and Action (CEREAL), Precarización e inestabilidad en el empleo. Mexico City: Cereal, 2000.

10. Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Acción Nacional, "Iniciativa de decreto que reforma a la Ley Federal de Trabjajo," typescript of 171 pages, 1995 and Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Acción Nacional, "Inciativa de decreto que reforma el Artículo 123 de la Constitución Politíca de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos," typescript of 7 pages," 1995.

11. The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), affiliated with the PRI, issued a short statement written by Lic. Juan S. Millan L. Secretary of Education and Social Communication of the CTM, arguing that de Buen's proposal was an employer proposal that would attack the historic gains of the labor unions. But the CTM particularly attacked de Buen's proposal that strikes should be based on secret ballot votes, that workers should have the right to join or form a union as well as to refuse to join a union, and that unions should be independent of political parties. The CTM recognized that De Buen's proposal threatened to dissolve the union-party-state system. - Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), Secretaria de Educación y Comunicación Social, "El Porqué rechazamos las Propuestas Laborales del Sector Privado para el Sexenio 1994-2000," typescript of 15 pages, March 1994.

12. Partido de la Revolución Democrática, "Anteproyecto de Reforma Laboral," typescript of 369 pages, no date. See Michal Kohout, "Le nuove riforme legislative del lavoro in Messico," in Novus Campus which gives a more detailed analysis of the changes proposed in both bills.

13. See Gaceta Parliamentaria, Camara de Diputados, numero 1172, Jan 20, 2003

14. For example, the federal registrar, Maria de las Mercedes Martinez Barrera was previously the legal advisor for the Confederacion Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (Employers' Association for the Republic of Mexico).

15. Some local labor boards had already begun requesting items such as workers' signatures, pay stubs, or even proof of withdrawal from the official union (on the basis that workers cannot belong to two unions at the same time) as proof that the union actually represented them. The Mexican Supreme Court just resolved a conflict between two lower courts, ruling that the imposition of such additional requirements violates the Federal Labor Law.

16. For example, Art 47, §XV provides that failure to advise the worker or labor board in writing of the date and reason for discharge will in itself render the discharge unjustified in the absence of proof to the contrary. (Of course, given the opportunity to present other types of proof, an employer will virtually always do so, undercutting the significance of the presumption of illegality). Another example occurs in Article 3, which prohibits discrimination. A subsequent section states: "Distinctions, exclusions or preferences are not considered discriminatory where they are based of particular qualifications which a specific job requires. A third example involves the question of seniority. The Federal Labor Law provides for filling open jobs based on a seniority system. The PAN's proposal revises that to state that the open jobs will be filled by those workers who have been trained by the company, and that under equal conditions the most assiduous and punctual will receive preference. Gaceta Parliamentaria, Camara de Diputados, numero 1172, Jan 20, 2003.

17. Although the law purports to provide a secret ballot process, by imposing prerequisites that obligate a union to disclose its members in order to initiate the process which will lead to the election, the proposal requires an open (non-secret) demonstration of support prior to the election itself. This effectively gives the employer and official union license to discharge workers prior to the election, eliminating those likely to vote against them prior to the secret ballot election.

18. According to the UNT representatives Arturo Alcalde Justiniani and Hector Barba García, "This proposed law is a monstrous attempt to do away with Mexican Labor Law, in that not only does it eliminate job security in individual employment relations, but it nullifies access to collective bargaining and representation, generating an impermeable ring in favor of protection contracts and altering the foundation, affecting both substantive and procedural law. Arturo Alcalde Justiniani and Hector Barba García, "Proyecto de nueva Ley Federal de Trabajo por la CTM y la CROC representando al Congreso del Trabajo y un grupo de abogados litigates de empresa ostentando la representación del sector empresarial," typescript in 18 pages, December 2002, at p.5.

19. For example, the PAN's proposal indicates that one of its objectives is to "erradicate the practices of simulation, vice, corruption, and bureaucracy..." Gaceta Parliamentaria, Camara de Diputados, numero 1172, Jan 20, 2003, at p.3.

20. The UNT version includes many other proposals which would modify both the federal Labor Law and the Constitution. In addition to the reforms listed above, it would categorize labor rights as human rights; expand protection from discrimination to include additional bases - ethnicity, sexual preference, marital status, health and disability; limit the category of who may be considered "confidential" and thus excluded from protection; confirming the obligations of an employer who receives services by workers provided by another employer; defining an enterprise broadly so that workers are protected irrespective of the legal structure of the business; impose liability on employers who attempt to avoid the LFT by hiring workers under individual contracts which purport to exceptions or who have employees sign blank pieces of paper which are later used to support claims of voluntary resignation; clarify the obligations of employers in successor situations; provide protection for the rights of seasonal workers; add sexual harrassment as a legitimate cause for discharge; provide that failure to provide correct notice of discharge would render it unjustified; add additional protections where workers are fired within three months prior or after a contract ratification vote or representation election; the work week would be reduced to 40 hours with two days of rest; maintains current holidays, but upon agreement certain holidays may be taken on Monday or Friday; expand number of vacation days from minimum of 6 to 10; give priority to single parents to take vacation to coincide with school vacations should they so choose; establish a single minimum wage throughout the country which would be approved by the House of Deputies based on studies by an independent national institute; piece work would also be subject to this minimum; year end bonuses would be increased from 15 to 30 days' wages; authorize electronic payment of wages with consent of the worker provided that no additional charge; clarify that dues may be deducted from wages for both members and non-members to cover costs of contract administration, as well as dues for other purposes in order to prevent fraud by ghost unions; would use the same mechanism outlined for determining the minimum wage, for determining percent of profitsharing, remove barriers in current law limiting employee challenges to employer declarations, and removing barrier to employee participation in administration of the business; would establish labor-management commissions responsible for productivity, quality and training, establish employer obligation to provide necessary information regarding technology, finance, market and organization of the business, as well as investment and other plans, require agreements regarding productivity to be included within collective bargaining agreements, and provide for intervention of labor inspectors; prohibit sexual harassment, which is defined to include requiring proof of lack of pregnancy as a pre-requisite for employment; reduce from 20 to 15 years the length of employment required under the current law for application of more stringent prohibitions on discharge for senior employees; 15 years' service shall not be required for retirement pay, which will be based on years of actual service; nor will it be limited to the amount of two times the minimum wage; the period of leave before and after pregnancy would be increased from 12 to 14 weeks, distributed in accordance with the written recommendation of the doctor rather than split in half, and the last two weeks may be taken by either the mother or father; would decrease from 6 to 5 the number of hours that a minor of 14 to 16 may work; eliminates the tax burden on employees of universities or other educational institutions who receive educational benefits; would bring bank workers under the provisions of the LFT rather than a separate provision, and would bring state and municipal workers under the LFT rather than the laws of the states. There are also new protections for agricultural workers, providing that the purchasers of communal land must give preference to those who formerly worked that land or provide severance pay as in the case of a discharge without cause; that the time spent by workers in traveling to an industrial zone shall be included in calculating the work day; that there will be particular requirements for profit-sharing to protect agricultural workers. In order to encourage education, under the UNT proposal domestic workers must be given the equivalent to seven minimum wages for school supplies. As indicated above, the UNT proposal also sets out a framework for determining union representation and effectuating recognition of collective bargaining agreements. Iniciativas de Reforma a la Constitucion y a la Ley Federal del Trabajo, UNT, October 31, 2002.

21. Iniciativas de Reforma a la Constitucion y a la Ley Federal del Trabajo, UNT, October 31, 2002, at p.2.

22. Prior labor law reform proposals were opposed both by the official unions, concerned about maintaining their positions, as well as by more progressive unions such as the Mexican Electrical Workers Union (SME) and lawyers who were concerned that proposing labor law reform was like opening a can of worms, and that in the absence of sufficient strength it could result in the repeal of existing protections. While the official unions have now endorsed the Fox-PAN version, there is a progressive wing that is still arguing emphatically against any modification. See, for example, Trabajadores, Vol 6, No. 30 (May-June, 2002) where Oscar Alzaga protests the internet consultation initiated by the STPS, as biased against working people who generally have no access to the internet, and asking only for comments from those interested in reforming the LFT, "not for [those concerned about reforming] the rest of the labor legislation, nor much less for those who believe that it should stay the way it is and that it should be complied with..." at p.10. In a piece that begins on the back cover of the same issue, SME concludes that "The government of today attacks, life, democracy and employment. For this, those of us from the Mexican Electrical Workers (SME) oppose its modification and defend the application of art. 123 [of the constitution] and its [effectuating] law. We do so and ratify this under the principals of it origin, those which are its roots. No more, but nor will there be less." (Inside back cover).

23. World Bank February 12, 2003 "Unions and Collective Bargaining Economic Effects in a Global Environment."

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